













Look at a red apple. Now close your eyes and visualize this apple. Your perceptual state and your imagery of the apple are very similar in some respects. They are also different in some respects. The aim of this paper is to address three questions about the relation between perception and imagination: 

(a)	How similar are perception and imagination and what explains this similarity?
(b)	How different are perception and imagination and what explains this difference?
(c)	How do perception and imagination interact? 





There are many uses of the term ‘imagination’ as, no doubt, other contributors to this volume argued [REF to other contributions in the volume]. The sense of imagination I will focus on here is mental imagery. Having mental imagery of an apple should be differentiated from imagining that there is an apple in the kitchen, an imagining episode, which amounts to having a propositional attitude. The sense of imagination where there are interesting questions about the relation between perception and imagination is not propositional imagination, but mental imagery.​[1]​ These are often even labeled as ‘quasi-perceptual’ states (see, e.g., Richardson, 1969, p. 2). If they are in fact quasi-perceptual, then it is important to clarify how they are related to perceptual states. 
	The example I used by way of introducing mental imagery at the beginning of the paper was closing your eyes and visualizing an apple. This is clearly one example of mental imagery, but in some ways a misleading, or at least unrepresentative one. First, mental imagery, is not necessarily visual: I use the term ‘mental imagery’ to cover visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc imagery. 
	Second and more importantly, the example of closing one’s eyes was an example of an active, intended and voluntary act. But mental imagery can also be passive and neither intended nor voluntary. We can have mental imagery even if we are not trying to visualize anything – when, for example, we are having involuntary flashbacks to some scene that we have seen earlier. This is especially clear in the auditory sense modality, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of earworms: tunes that pop into our heads and that we keep on having auditory imagery of, even though we do not want to. Further, if mental imagery is a necessary feature of episodic memory (Byrne et al. 2007, see also Berryhill et al. 2007’s overview), then it is also involuntary inasmuch as episodic memory can also be involuntary.​[2]​ 
Third, I will assume that mental imagery, like most mental states, can be conscious or unconscious. Closing one’s eyes and visualizing an apple is clearly a conscious instance of mental imagery, but mental imagery can also be unconscious. Ian Philips has argued that the reason why there is a significant variation in people’s report on their use of imagery is not that some of them use imagery and others don’t but that the imagery of some people tends to be conscious and the imagery of some others tends to be unconscious (Philips 2014). I myself have argued for the claim that unconscious mental imagery is very widespread because the mental imagery by virtue of which we represent occluded parts of perceived objects is normally unconscious (Nanay 2010b, see also Section V.a. below). While Section III and IV will be about conscious mental imagery, the unconscious cases will play an important role in Section V. 
Finally, the example of closing one’s eyes and visualizing an apple is somewhat atypical inasmuch as the apple I visualize with my eyes closed is likely to be in some abstract visualized space. But we can also visualize an apple in our egocentric space: I can visualize an apple to be right here on the keyboard of my laptop. Again, having mental imagery of something in our egocentric space is not something unusual – we use mental imagery this way very often. When you are looking at your empty living room, thinking about what kind of furniture to buy, you’re likely to try to form a mental imagery of, say, a sofa not in an abstract space ‘in the mind’s eye’, but in your living room. And when you’re trying to figure out whether this sofa would fit through the main entrance, again, you are having a mental imagery of the sofa in the very concrete space of the main entrance of your house. 
These three distinctions are orthogonal to one another: we can have conscious egocentric voluntary mental imagery, unconscious egocentric voluntary mental imagery, conscious egocentric involuntary mental imagery, and so on. But all these different kinds of mental imagery attribute properties, in a quasi-perceptual way, to a scene or object that this scene or object is not perceived as having. At this point, I use the term ‘quasi-perceptual’ as a mere place holder because part of what is at stake in answering the question I am now turning to, the question about the similarity between perception and mental imagery, is exactly a way of explicating what is meant by the quasi-perceptual nature of mental imagery. 

III.	The similarity between perception and mental imagery

As we have seen, if I visualize a red apple and if I see one, the phenomenal character of my experience will be similar. But how similar are these experiences? And what can we explain this similarity? 
	The standard starting point for the discussion of the similarity between mental imagery and perception is the Perky experiment, where subjects looking at a white wall were asked to visualize objects while keeping their eyes open. Unbeknownst to them, barely visible images of the visualized objects were projected on the wall. The surprising finding is that the subjects took themselves to be visualizing the objects – while in fact they were perceiving them (Perky 1910, Segal 1972, Segal-Nathan 1964). The standard interpretation of this experiment is that if perceiving and visualizing could be confused under these circumstances, then they must be phenomenally very similar (but see Hopkins 2012’s criticism and Nanay 2012’s response).
	So far, I talked about the phenomenal similarity between perception and mental imagery, but it is important to note that there has been a lot of research on the similarity between these two processes that do not show up in our phenomenology. There is, for example, an almost complete overlap between the brain regions involved in perception and the brain regions involved in mental imagery, which suggests that the mental processes that make perception possible are the very same mental processes that make mental imagery possible (see, e.g., Kosslyn et al. 2006). Further, the patterns of cortical activation are also similar in perception and mental imagery (Page et al. 2011).
	Another important set of experimental findings in this context is about our eye movements during visual imagery and visual perception (I will focus on the visual sense modality for ease of exposition, but we have very similar phenomena in the olfactory sense modality, see Bensafi et al. 2003): our eye movement during visual imagery re-enacts that of the perception of the same visual scene. When we visualize a scene, our spontaneous eye movements reflect the content of the visual scene (Brandt & Stark 1997, Laeng & Teodorescu 2002, Mast & Kosslyn 2002, Spivey & Geng 2001, Johansson et al. 2006, Altmann 2004, see also Laeng et al. 2014 for a good summary). When we perceive a pattern in a grid, our eye movements are isomorphic to our eye movements when we visualize the same pattern.​[3]​ 
	But if it is true that perception and mental imagery are similar in all these respects then we should ask what explains this similarity. An obvious answer to this question is that the phenomenology of these two mental states is similar because their content is similar (Ishiguro 1967, cf. Kind 2001, Currie 1995, pp. 36-37. and Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, p. 27, Noordhof 2002, Nanay forthcoming). The relation between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology has been an important issue in philosophy of perception and one influential view there is intentionalism, the view that perceptual phenomenology supervenes on perceptual content. If the phenomenology of mental imagery also supervenes on the content of mental imagery, then the similarity of the phenomenology of  mental imagery and of perception can be explained in a straightforward manner by the similarity of the content of these two mental states. But one does not need to endorse intentionalism to hold this view: as long as there is some dependence relation (not necessarily as strong as supervenience) between content and phenomenology, similarity between content can explain similarity between phenomenology. 
	It is important to emphasize that this is not an explanation for why mental imagery and perception have similar phenomenal character. It is, rather, an explanatory scheme, which can be turned into an actual explanation only if we supply an account of perceptual content and an account of the content of mental imagery. And at this point some philosophers of perception will refuse to take this route because they deny that perceptual states have content. I will come back to what they could say about the phenomenal similarity between perception and mental imagery below. But a further problem is that there is no agreement about how we should think about the content of perceptual states (and about the content of mental imagery). One widespread way of thinking about perceptual content is in terms of propositional content: perceptual states, just like beliefs and desires, are attitudes toward a proposition. But if we think of perceptual content and the content of mental imagery this way (see, e.g., Currie 1995, pp. 36-37, Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, p. 27), then it becomes less clear how the similarity of content would explain the similarity of phenomenology. There are many propositional attitudes (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc) that could share the same propositional content with perception and they do not seem to share the same phenomenology – at least not in the strong(er) sense we are trying to explain here. A further, not too promising, candidate for perceptual content would be to talk about the object of the perceptual state. This will not lead very far as the object of my perceptual state when I see an apple is the apple. The object of my mental imagery, in contrast, doesn’t exist. So these are not similar at all. 
	I take the most promising way of cashing out the phenomenal similarity between perception and mental imagery in terms of content to be grounded in a way of thinking about content as the attribution of properties to objects (Burge 2010, Peacocke 1986, 1989, Nanay 2010a, 2013). Perceptual states attribute properties to the perceived object. Mental imagery attributes properties to the imagined object. While the objects these properties are attributed to are very different (one exists, the other may not), the properties attributed to them are similar. And this makes the two content similar, which, in turn, makes the phenomenology of the two mental states also similar. This is not supposed to be a full explanation. More needs to be said about these attributed properties and the way they are attributed. For example, I argued that we need to make some further assumptions about the way these properties are attributed by perceptual states and by mental imagery (more specifically, how the determinacy of these properties change) in order to explain how our attention is exercised in the two cases (Nanay forthcoming). 
	None of this explanatory strategy is available to those who deny that perceptual states have content (see, e.g., Campbell 2002, Brewer 2011, Martin 2004). So what can they say about the phenomenal similarity between perception and mental imagery? The two can’t resemble in virtue of their content because one of them has no content. Further, those who deny that perception has content tend to argue that it is constituted by the relation to the actual token perceived object. They tend to take this to be an essential feature of perceptual states. This comes out nicely in the discussion of the ‘common denominator’, or lack thereof, between perception and hallucination – the disjunctivism debate. Perception of an apple and the hallucination of an apple can have very similar phenomenal character – we can, after all, take our hallucination to be veridical perception. But those who deny that perception has content tend to insist that there is no substantial common denominator between these two cases: between perception and hallucination. While they seem similar, they are, ‘by their nature’, or ‘essentially’, very different: one of them is a relation to an actual token object, whereas the other isn’t. But if the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of these two mental states can’t explain the phenomenal similarity, then what does? Note that we can raise this question not just about the relation between perception and hallucination, but also about the relation between perception and mental imagery (I will say more about whether and in what sense hallucination could be considered to be a form of mental imagery in Section IV). 
	Those who deny that perception has content do have an account of this similarity: it is the Dependency Thesis. According to the Dependency Thesis, having mental imagery of an object consists of representing the experience of this object. So it is not the similarity of content that explains why perception and mental imagery are phenomenally similar. Rather, by representing it, mental imagery inherits the phenomenal properties of the perceptual state (Martin 2002, p. 406, Smith 2006, pp. 53-54). This is the so-called Dependency Thesis (Peacocke 1985, Martin 2002, see also Noordhof 2002 for analysis).
How does this work? An extra premise that is needed is what Martin calls the ‘transparency’ of imagined experiences. He says: 

[…] I assume at this stage that Dependency commits one to the claim that in imagining some scene one thereby imagines an experience of the scene--it is no part of Dependency to deny that one imagines the scene when one imagines an experience of the scene (Martin 2002, p. 404). 

Thus, by imagining an experience of an apple, we do imagine an apple. Thus, the content of our mental imagery is the experience of an apple but it is also the apple itself (see also Smith 2006, footnote 18). Both the content of mental imagery and the content of perceiving include the apple itself. 
	This somewhat complicated explanatory scheme has been criticized for a number of reasons (Noordhof 2002, Currie-Ravenscroft 2002, Gregory 2010, 2014). And while it seems that because of the transparency assumption the Dependency Thesis can explain the phenomenal similarity between perception and mental imagery, it is much less clear that it can explain the physiological and behavioral similarities. Consider the findings about the similarity of eye movements in vision and visual imagery. According to the Dependency Thesis, the mental imagery of x consists of representing the experience of x. And representing is not something that would involve specific eye movements. In fact, most often, it doesn’t. It is the content of this representation, that is, the experience of x that involves eye movements. Why is it then, that the vehicle of this representation requires identical eye movements to the ones the content of this representation requires? The Dependency Thesis, can, no doubt, be supplemented by some further theory that would explain this. But it is not clear how such an explanation would go. And, in any case, no such explanation is entailed by the Dependency Thesis alone. In contrast, the explanatory scheme of accounting for similarities in phenomenology in terms of similarities in content can explain this behavioral similarity neatly (see Gregory 2014, Nanay forthcoming). 

IV.	The difference between perception and mental imagery

Of course, seeing an apple and closing one’s eyes and visualizing an apple are, in spite of all the similarities discussed in the previous section, very different experiences. Seeing an apple can prompt me to reach out and grab it. Having mental imagery of the apple very rarely prompts us to reach out and grab the imagined apple. Further, seeing an apple seems to have a certain phenomenal oomph that is missing in the case of imagining the apple. This phenomenal oomph is often described as ‘feeling of presence’. When we see an apple, we have this feeling of presence. When we have mental imagery of it, we don’t have this feeling of presence. 
	Thinking about the difference between perception and mental imagery is as important and as old as thinking about the similarity between them. Hume, an influential advocate of the similarity between imagery and perception, was also very explicit about how they differ: imagery is a paler version of perception. Regardless of whether we explain the phenomenal similarity between mental imagery and perception in terms of content or with the help of the Dependency Thesis, this explanation needs to extend to how these experiences differ. 
	And here those who deny that perception has content may seem to have some explanatory advantage: if mental imagery and perception are very different kinds of mental states in that the latter, but not the former, is constituted by the relation to an actual token object, then the presence or lack of this actual relation to an actual object can explain nicely how the two experiences differ in terms of the presence or absence of this oomph. We get a feeling of presence in perception because the perceived object is present – in fact, what perception is is being related to this object that is present. And in the case of mental imagery, there is no feeling of presence because there is nothing present. 
	How about those who explain the similarity of mental imagery and perception in terms of the content of these two mental states? What can they say about the difference between these two experiences? There are at least two options. One option would be to follow Hume and argue that the difference is that of intensity. Another option, and one I myself defended, is to argue that the differences in the determinacy of the attributed properties comes in a bottom-up way in perception, whereas it comes in a top-down way in mental imagery. If you are looking at the apple and you are attending to the exact shade of red of the patch on its right hand side, the high determinacy of this attributed color property comes in a bottom-up manner from what you see. But if you close your eyes and visualize an apple, you can still attribute this very determinate property to the patch on the right hand side of the apple, but in this case, this determinacy comes in a top-down manner: from our memory or beliefs or expectations. It is important that this difference is not a difference in determinacy in general: not that mental imagery is less determinate than perception (this would be a version of Hume’s view), but that the extra determinacy comes from different sources. 
	One may worry that these differences fail to explain the difference in the feeling of presence or oomph of these two experiences. And this may be right. But I don’t see any reason to take the difference in the feeling of presence to be a mark of the difference between the phenomenology of perception and mental imagery. It sounds right that perception is, at least when conscious, accompanied by a feeling of presence. But I see no reason to think that mental imagery in general is not accompanied by a feeling of presence. [CROSSREF to Ichikawa]
	Two examples: first, take mixed perception/imagery cases (see Section V.b). Suppose that you are looking at your laptop and imagine it to be yellow. Or you imagine it to be twice as big as it is. These are genuine examples of mental imagery but they are still accompanied by the feeling of presence: I still ‘feel’ the laptop as very much present. The oomph is still there. The second example is perhaps more controversial. Dreams and hallucinations are often taken to be special cases of mental imagery (Allen forthcoming) [CROSSREF to Ichikawa]: they represent their object by attributing properties to them quasi-perceptually that we don’t perceive these objects as having. And they are very often (in the case of hallucination maybe always) accompanied by a feeling of presence. 
	We have seen in Section II that mental imagery is sometimes conscious, but sometimes it is not and while it is sometimes voluntary, sometimes it’s not. Similarly, mental imagery is sometimes, but not always, accompanied by the feeling of presence. In the case of hallucinations, dreams and of imagining the laptop I am looking at to be yellow, it is. When I’m closing my eyes and visualize an apple, it is not. This is yet another way in which closing one’s eyes and visualizing an apple is not representative of mental imagery in general.​[4]​ 
	But then what originally appeared to be an explanatory advantage for those who deny that perception has content now seems to be a disadvantage as they would now need to explain why the feeling of presence is present in those cases where there are blatantly no actual token objects to be related to (like in the case of dreams and hallucinations). And they also need to explain and do so with the help of the conceptual apparatus of the Dependency Thesis how some instances of representing an experience gets us the feeling of presence, whereas other instances of representing an experience doesn’t. I am not saying that those who deny that perception has content have nothing to say about these questions. But their explanation of the differences between the phenomenology of perception and mental imagery will not come for free, to say the least. 

V.	The interaction between perception and mental imagery

In the remainder of this essay, I discuss about two important debates about the interaction between perception and mental imagery: one about whether imagery is necessary for perception and one about mixed cases. 

V.i. Is mental imagery necessary for perception?

When talking about the interaction between perception and mental imagery, the most obvious question we can ask is whether one is necessary for the other. While it is an important question whether perception is necessary for mental imagery (and some experiments about the mental imagery of congenitally blind people show that the answer is not at all obvious, see, e.g., Arditi et al. 1988), what I take to be the more interesting and more controversial idea is that mental imagery is necessary for perception. 
	An old and influential (Kantian) idea about the interaction between perception and mental imagery is that mental imagery is “a necessary ingredient of perception itself” (Strawson 1974, p. 54 – the metaphor and the quote are originally from Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, A120, fn. a, see also Sellars 1978, Thomas 2009 [CROSSREF to the Kant entry]). One way in which this idea can be cashed out is that in order to perceive something as it is, we need to imagine what it would be (or how it would look) if things were a little different. An example of this approach is the view that in order to see objects as three dimensional, we need to, in some sense, imagine how they would look if we were to look at them from a different angle (Lewis 1929, pp. 117-153, Lewis 1946, Noë 2004). 
	Another way of arguing for a much more modest version of the necessity claim is to say that mental imagery is necessary for some forms of perception. Here is an example. Amodal perception is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects: those parts of the cat, for example that are hidden behind the tree. 
	How are occluded parts of perceived objects represented? It seems that they are not represented by beliefs – they seem to have sensory phenomenology. They are not represented perceptually either in the strict sense of the term as we receive no sensory stimulation from occluded parts of perceived objects (because they are, well, occluded). I have argued on empirical and conceptual grounds that they are represented by means of mental imagery: we have mental imagery of the cat’s tail, which is occluded by the tree (Nanay 2010b, see also Briscoe 2011).
	But if this is true then mental imagery is a pervasive feature of the vast majority of our perceptual states. As we live in a non-transparent world, amodal perception is a necessary feature of virtually all of our perceptual states – it would be very difficult to imagine a scenario where we see something but no amodal perception is involved: if we see something, those things that are behind this thing are occluded from our vision. But then if amodal perception is a way of having mental imagery, this gives us a version of the original Kantian claim: in this limited and restricted sense it is true that mental imagery ‘is a necessary ingredient of perception itself’. 
	A related, so far unexplored argument for a similar perception/mental imagery mixed case concerns peripheral vision. Vision can only attribute very determinable properties in peripheral vision. This is especially true when it comes to color properties, which is what I will focus on – there are no color receptor cells that would correspond to the periphery of our visual field on our retina. But our experience of the periphery of the visual field is not black and white. Where does the color experience come from then? If mental imagery is the quasi-perceptual attribution of properties to object that these objects are not perceived as having, then it is mental imagery that supplies color (and the extra degree of determinacy for other properties that are perceived as determinable). Vision doesn’t (and can’t) attribute color properties (or other determinate properties) in peripheral vision. But mental imagery provides this missing degree of determinacy, which would explain why our visual experience of the periphery of our visual field is not black and white. 
	 
V.ii. Perception/mental imagery mixed cases

I defined mental imagery as the quasi-perceptual attribution of properties to objects that we don’t perceive these objects as having. There are two ways this attribution can happen: we can attribute properties to an object we imagine (and don’t see). Visualizing the apple with eyes closed is an example of this. Or we can attribute imagined properties to an object we see. 
	Both of these ways of having mental imagery are consistent with mixed perception/imagery cases. When I am at the furniture store and I am looking at a sofa, imagining how it would look in the living room, I am looking at an actual object and attributing imagined properties to it – properties it does not have, like being in my living room. And then I go home and look around in my living room imagining the sofa (which is not here, it’s still in the furniture store) into my egocentric space in the living room. I am attributing properties (‘real’ properties in some sense, for example, spatial location properties) to an imagined object – to an object that is not there. 
	These mixed perception/mental imagery cases are widespread. Neil Van Leeuwen has argued for their importance in understanding pretense (Van Leeuwen 2011, see also Schellenberg 2013). Robert Briscoe calls them ‘make-perceive’ and examined the role it can play in the guidance of our actions (Briscoe 2008). If it is true that amodal perception involves mental imagery, then (virtually) all of our perceptual states are in fact mixed perception/mental imagery states. Here is an example: you are looking at the landscape through your very dirty window: you represent those parts of the landscape that are occluded by specks of dirt by means of mental imagery and you represent those parts of the landscape that are not occluded by specks of dirt perceptually. The same goes for seeing a scene behind a wire fence: you have a wire-fence shaped mental imagery and many square-shaped bits in between represented perceptually. 
	Explaining the phenomenology of these examples will be an important data point for any explanation of the similarity between the phenomenal character of perception and mental imagery. If we explain this similarity in terms of content, then we have an easy time as the content will be very similar. Remember that the difference between the way perception and mental imagery represents a scene is in where the extra determinacy is coming from: from top-down (in mental imagery) or from bottom-up (in perception). But as there are mixed top-down/bottom-up cases (and, if we can believe the vast cognitive penetrability literature, that is, the literature on how perception is influenced by higher cognitive processes (see Lupyan et al. 2010, MacPherson 2012), these are the rule, not the exception), there are also mixed perception/mental imagery cases. 




I hoped to show that the relation between mental imagery and perception is crucial both for philosophers of perception and for philosophers working on imagination. It is crucial for those who are interested in imagination as the comparison with perception highlights the importance of some distinctions between different kinds of mental imagery: voluntary versus involuntary, conscious versus unconscious, egocentric versus non-egocentric, accompanied by the feeling of presence or not.
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^1	  Propositional imagination can, of course, also involve the exercise of mental imagery, so these two categories are not meant to be exclusive. 
^2	  What I mean by mental imagery should not be confused with what is sometimes referred to as ‘sensory imagination’. Sensory imagination (e.g., imagining seeing something) is one way in which we can exercise our mental imagery, but not the only one. 
^3	  It is important to keep apart the question about the similarity between mental imagery and perception from the grand ‘Imagery Debate’ of the 1980s (see Tye 1991 for a summary). More specifically, admitting that there is important similarities between mental imagery and perception (in terms of physiology, of behaviour or of phenomenology) does not commit one to deny that mental imagery is propositional (as long as one, like Pylyshyn 2007, also holds that perception is propositional as well).
^4	  This way of thinking about the feeling of presence is not at all outside the mainstream. In fact, it is a direct consequence of one of the most influential account of the feeling of presence as metacognitive feeling (endorsed also by some who deny that perception has no content, see Martin and Dokic 2013).
^5	  This work was supported by the EU FP7 CIG grant PCIG09-GA-2011-293818 and the FWO Odysseus grant G.0020.12N. I am grateful for Amy Kind’s and Dominic Gregory’s comments on an earlier draft.
